An Unwelcome Burden: Sexual Harassment, Consent and Legal Complaints by Hastie, Bethany
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
Volume 58, Issue 2 (Spring 2021) Article 5 
7-15-2021 
An Unwelcome Burden: Sexual Harassment, Consent and Legal 
Complaints 
Bethany Hastie 
Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Article 
Citation Information 
Hastie, Bethany. "An Unwelcome Burden: Sexual Harassment, Consent and Legal Complaints." Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 58.2 (2021) : 419-452. 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol58/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. 
An Unwelcome Burden: Sexual Harassment, Consent and Legal Complaints 
Abstract 
The legal definition of sexual harassment was set down thirty years ago in the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision of Janzen v. Platy Enterprises as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally 
affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victim of the 
harassment.” Remarkably little has changed in the interpretation and application of these elements since 
Janzen was decided. However, both legal and social norms concerning sexual misconduct and consent 
have substantially developed in that time. This article unpacks the problematic consequences flowing 
from the treatment of consent in sexual harassment complaints under human rights law and argues for a 
shift in the legal principles governing sexual harassment complaints. It draws support from criminal law 
and tort law, each of which has shifted towards an affirmative consent standard due to similar problems 
and concerns regarding reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes. 
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An Unwelcome Burden: Sexual 
Harassment, Consent and Legal 
Complaints
BETHANY HASTIE*
The legal definition of sexual harassment was set down thirty years ago in the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision of Janzen v. Platy Enterprises as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature 
that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences 
for the victim of the harassment.” Remarkably little has changed in the interpretation and 
application of these elements since Janzen was decided. However, both legal and social 
norms concerning sexual misconduct and consent have substantially developed in that time. 
This article unpacks the problematic consequences flowing from the treatment of consent 
in sexual harassment complaints under human rights law and argues for a shift in the legal 
principles governing sexual harassment complaints. It draws support from criminal law and 
tort law, each of which has shifted towards an affirmative consent standard due to similar 
problems and concerns regarding reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes.
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THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT was set down over thirty 
years ago in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Janzen v. Platy Enterprises 
as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work 
environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims of the 
harassment.”1 This definition has been interpreted as requiring three essential 
elements to establish a complaint of sexual harassment under human rights law: 
(1) conduct of a sexual nature; (2) that is, or ought reasonably to be known to 
be, unwelcome;2 (3) that produces adverse consequences for the complainant. 
Remarkably little has changed in the interpretation and application of these 
elements since Janzen was decided. However, both legal and social norms 
concerning sexual misconduct and consent have substantially developed in that 
time. In particular, the #MeToo movement in 2017 initiated a new wave of 
social, political, and legal attention to the issue of sexual harassment. These events 
have created heightened awareness and sensitivity to this pervasive issue that is 
known to affect many Canadians. A 2014 Angus Reid poll found that forty-three 
per cent of women and twelve per cent of men in Canada reported experiencing 
sexual harassment in their workplace.3 Further, evidence suggests that legal claims 
concerning sexual harassment are increasingly pursued through human rights 
1. [1989] 1 SCR 1252 at 1284 [Janzen]. For further elaboration on the conduct element of the 
definition, see Mahmoodi v UBC and Dutton, 1999 BCHRT 56 at para 136 [Mahmoodi].
2. Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 140. Concerning the elements of the test for sexual 
harassment as a whole, see Janzen, supra note 1 at 1284; Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 135. 
3. Angus Reid Institute, “Three-in-ten Canadians say they’ve been sexually harassed at work, but 
very few have reported this to their employers” (5 December 2014) at 2, 11, online (pdf ): 
<angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014.12.05-Sexual-Harassment-at-work.pdf>.
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tribunals rather than civil litigation, due to relaxed evidentiary standards and a 
less adversarial atmosphere.4 
This article argues for a shift in the law of sexual harassment, in order to bring 
the legal principles in line with contemporary social and legal understandings of 
consent. In earlier research, I considered how the presence of the “unwelcome” 
element in sexual harassment law in Canada facilitates the introduction of 
gender-based myths and stereotypes.5 I found that these myths and stereotypes may 
operate to undermine a complainant’s credibility and to influence the reasoning 
and outcome of the complaint.6 This research builds on existing scholarship 
that problematizes the “unwelcome” element of sexual harassment law.7 It also 
presents similarities to issues that are known to plague victims of sexual violence 
in the criminal justice system.8 Noted issues regarding the historical treatment 
4. Sean Fine, “Ontario Human Rights Tribunal gains steam as alternative route for sexual 
assault cases” (3 April 2018), online: Globe and Mail <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/
article-workplace-sexual-assault-survivors-claim-victory-at-human-rights>. Note that 
civil courts do not independently provide a basis for a legal claim of discrimination to be 
brought. Such a claim must be tied to, for example, a constructive or wrongful dismissal 
claim. It is also worth noting that few complainants take formal legal action when faced with 
workplace harassment, and fewer of those proceed to a full hearing.
5. Bethany Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment: Assessing the Effectiveness of Human 
Rights Law in Canada” (August 2019), online: Peter A Allard School of Law <commons.
allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs/500> [Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”]; Bethany Hastie, 
“Workplace Sexual Harassment and the “Unwelcome” Requirement: An Analysis of BC 
Human Rights Tribunal Decisions from 2010 to 2016” (2020) 32 CJWL 61 [Hastie, 
“Unwelcome Requirement”].
6. Hastie, “Unwelcome Requirement”, supra note 5 at 63.
7. See e.g. Arjun P Aggarwal & Madhu M Gupta, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 3rd ed 
(Butterworths, 2000) at 120-37; Janine Benedet, “Book Review of Sexual Harassment in 
the Workplace by Aggarwal and Gupta” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LJ 843 at 846 [Benedet, 
“Book Review”]; Janine Benedet, “Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the 
Unwelcome Influence of Rape Law” (1996) 3 Mich J Gender & L 125; Hastie, “Unwelcome 
Requirement”, supra note 5 at 69.
8. Hastie, “Unwelcome Requirement”, supra note 5. For examples of similar issues in the 
criminal justice system, see Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian 
Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41 Akron L 
Rev 865 [Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”]; Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault 
Law, Credibility, and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 
22 CJWL 397; Isabel Grant, “Intimate Partner Criminal Harassment through a Lens of 
Responsibilization” (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall LJ 552; Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial: 
Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal Profession (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018) 
[Craig, Putting Trials on Trial]; Elaine Craig, “Section 276 Misconstrued: The Failure to 
Properly Interpret and Apply Canada’s Rape Shield Provisions” (2016) 94 Can Bar Rev 45; 
Lise Gotell, “When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual History 
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of consent in relation to sexual offences, and the ways in which gender-based 
myths and stereotypes have operated to place the burden of establishing a lack of 
consent with the victim, led to the adoption of an affirmative consent standard 
in criminal law. Similar reasoning, evidencing a concern for the problematic 
consequences that would flow from a requirement for a plaintiff to establish a 
lack of consent, led the Supreme Court of Canada to affirm that consent is a 
defence to the tort of battery in the case of Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of 
London v. Scalera.9 
Affirmative consent standards have produced their own set of challenges.10 
Scholars have critiqued the ways in which the emphasis on a binary consent 
standard in law, in relation to sexual conduct, problematically oversimplifies and 
reduces narratives and experiences about sexuality and sexual encounters. These 
critiques disrupt traditional (conservative) assumptions that conceive of sexual 
violence as centrally about power.11 Scholars have further critically examined 
how the norm of affirmative consent in criminal law may lay the foundation for 
a repressive moral order and instill a narrative of weakness and helplessness in 
those meant to be protected.12 Common to the concerns raised about the legal 
construction of consent is an attentiveness to the ways in which a binary “yes or 
no” approach to consent to sexual conduct is unreflective of reality,13 and imposes 
a gendered lens on sexual interactions that entrenches notions of women’s 
vulnerability. Moreover, scholars in the United States, especially, have been vocal 
about the sexual “sanitization” of the workplace, in light of the advent and spread 
Evidence and the Disclosure of Personal Records” (2006) 43 Alta L Rev 743; Susan Ehrlich, 
“Perpetuating—and Resisting—Rape Myths in Trial Discourse,” in Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, 
Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice, and Women’s Activism (University of Ottawa 
Press, 2012) 389.
9. Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera, 2000 SCC 24 [Scalera]. Unlike the 
criminal law context, which has seen a series of cases develop and interpret the relevant legal 
principles and provisions relating to affirmative consent, Scalera presents the sole, leading 
authority on consent as a defence to (sexual) battery in tort law. 
10. See Aya Gruber, “Consent Confusion” (2016) 38 Cardozo L Rev 415 at 430 for a review of 
contemporary challenges and debates surrounding the concept of affirmative consent. See 
also Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton 
University Press, 2006) [Halley, Split Decisions].
11. See e.g. Heidi Matthews, “#MeToo as Sex Panic” in Bianca Fileborn & Rachel Loney-Howes, 
eds, #MeToo and the Politics of Social Change (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) at 267. 
12. See e.g. Janet Halley, “The Move to Affirmative Consent” (2016) 42 J Women in Culture & 
Society 257 [Halley, “Affirmative Consent”].
13. See e.g. Gruber, supra note 10.
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of prohibitive policies regarding workplace sexual conduct and relationships.14 
The formulation of sexual harassment law, it is argued, has resulted in repressive 
workplace policies and their implementation at the organizational level.15 These 
policies operate to suppress sexuality and intimacy in the workplace, to discipline, 
and to control workers for a broad range of behaviour, giving rise to similar 
concerns about overbreadth that have arisen in the context of criminal laws and 
affirmative consent.16
The introduction of the “unwelcome” element in Janzen may have been 
intended to guard against the very kind of “sanitization” that Vicki Schultz 
critiques, by excluding consensual or “welcomed” sexual interactions.17 
In practice, however, it has produced significant obstacles for complainants, most 
often women, to establish their complaint of sexual harassment against (most 
often) men. This article unpacks the problematic consequences flowing from 
the “unwelcome” element in sexual harassment complaints under human rights 
law, as governed by provincial human rights legislation,18 and argues for a shift 
in legal principles that would require respondents to establish “welcomeness” 
rather than requiring complainants to demonstrate “unwelcomeness.” I draw 
on the comparisons of criminal and tort law to illustrate the significance of 
considering who bears the burden of establishing consent (or lack thereof ) and 
why that matters. In other words, I draw on these comparisons to advance a 
structural critique: requiring a complainant in a sexual harassment complaint to 
establish a lack of consent requires her to shoulder an unfair burden and creates 
inappropriate space for gender-based stereotypes to influence the arguments, 
analysis, and outcome of legal complaints. As such, I take, as a starting point, 
that the law currently relies on consent-based elements, and my critique focuses 
on who ought to bear the burden of establishing (non)consent in the context of 
sexual harassment complaints under human rights law. Nonetheless, the broader 
consequences and normative values communicated by a continued reliance on 
consent and by continued regulation of sexual behaviour in the workplace, 
as documented by existing scholars, must be borne in mind.
14. See e.g. Vicki Schultz, “The Sanitized Workplace” (2003) 112 Yale LJ 2061 at 2090; Vicki 
Schultz, “The Sanitized Workplace Revisited” in Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E Jackson 
& Adam P Romero, eds, Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable 
Conversations (Ashgate, 2009) at 65 [Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”].
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. See e.g. Basic v Esquimalt Denture Clinic and another, 2020 BCHRT 138 at para 98 [Basic].
18. For examples from British Columbia and Ontario, see e.g. Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, 
c 210 [BC Code]; Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-19 [Ontario Code].
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In Part I, I review the development and doctrinal interpretations of sexual 
harassment law under human rights legislation in British Columbia and Ontario. 
I discuss how the “unwelcome” element allows for the problematic introduction 
of gender-based myths and stereotypes, through which a complainant’s 
credibility may be undermined and her lack of consent questioned. I draw on 
human rights decisions from British Columbia and Ontario to illustrate these 
claims.19 In Part II, I review how the tort of battery as well as criminal laws 
addressing sexual offences have each adopted an “affirmative consent” standard 
in order to respond to similar noted issues concerning reliance on gender-based 
myths and stereotypes in assessing legal claims. I conclude in Part III by drawing 
together these analyses to argue for a similar shift in the legal principles governing 
sexual harassment complaints under human rights law, establishing how existing 
principles of human rights law are sufficient to properly assess complaints of 
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND THE  
“UNWELCOME” ELEMENT
Sexual harassment complaints under human rights law are governed by a test that 
includes the requirement to establish that the respondent knew or ought to have 
known that their conduct was “unwelcome.”20 This “unwelcome” element has 
been critiqued as improperly responsibilizing women for harassment-avoidance, 
placing an undue burden on complainants, focusing the inquiry on a 
complainant’s own behaviour and conduct, and implying that sexual conduct in 
the workplace is presumptively welcome.21 My existing research has illustrated 
19. These decisions were retrieved as part of a larger study examining the trajectory of 
sexual harassment law from 2000 to 2018 in British Columbia and Ontario. See Hastie, 
“Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5.
20. Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 140.
21. See e.g. Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 7 at 131-32; Benedet, “Book Review”, supra note 7 at 
846; Kaitlyn Matulewicz, “Law and the Construction of Institutionalized Sexual Harassment 
in Restaurants” (2015) 30 CJLS 401 at 402-403 [Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual 
Harassment”] citing Marlene Kadar, “Sexual Harassment: Where We Stand; Research and 
Policy” (1983) 3 Windsor YB Access Just 358; Sandy Goundry, “Sexual Harassment in the 
Employment Context: The Legal Management of Working Women’s Experience” (1985) 
43 UT Fac L Rev 1; Fay Faraday, “Dealing with Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The 
Promise and Limitations of Human Rights Discourse” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 33; 
Kathleen Gallivan, “Sexual Harassment after Janzen v Platy: The Transformative Possibilities” 
(1991) 49 UT Fac L Rev 27; Judy Fudge, “Rungs on the Labour Law Ladder: Using Gender 
to Challenge Hierarchy” (1996) 60 Sask L Rev 237; Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: 
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that this element facilitates the introduction of, and reliance on, gender-based 
myths and stereotypes to undermine a complainant’s credibility and raise consent 
as an issue for a complainant to disprove.22 This Part reviews the evolution and 
contemporary doctrinal interpretations of sexual harassment law, with a focus 
on the “unwelcome” element, and examines how this element manifests the 
above-noted issues in contemporary case law. This demonstrates the problems 
attending the “unwelcome” element, providing a foundation from which to 
argue for a shift in legal doctrine.
A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS: LEGAL ELEMENTS AND 
DOCTRINAL INTERPRETATIONS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Sexual harassment as a form of discrimination was first defined by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the 1989 Janzen decision and can be broken down into three 
primary elements: (1) conduct of a sexual nature; (2) that is, or ought reasonably 
to be known to be, unwelcome; (3) that produces adverse consequences for 
the complainant.23 In the thirty years since Janzen was decided, case law has 
continued to interpret and refine these elements. 
Conduct falling within the definition of sexual harassment may be physical 
or psychological, overt or subtle, and may include verbal innuendoes, affectionate 
gestures, repeated social invitations, and unwelcome flirting, in addition to more 
blatant conduct such as leering, grabbing, or sexual assault.24 While physical 
conduct, such as unwanted touching, is blatant and often readily recognizable as 
sexual harassment, various kinds of verbal conduct are also recognised as sexual 
harassment. Verbal sexual harassment can include sexual innuendo, jokes, taunts, 
and comments about a person’s appearance or sexual habits, as well as quid pro quo 
harassment, where a supervisor or person in a position of authority makes sexual 
advances, invitations, or demands against a subordinate employee.25 However, 
as the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal most recently affirmed in Eva, 
The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2010); Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5 at 25; Kathryn Abrams, 
“The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment” (1998) 83 Cornell L Rev 1169 at 1221.
22. See Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5.
23. Janzen, supra note 1 at 1284.
24. See Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 7 at 14-18.
25. Gallivan, supra note 21 at 30. For an analysis of the conduct element in sexual harassment 
complaints at the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, see also Bethany Hastie, 
“Assessing Sexually Harassing Conduct in the Workplace: An Analysis of BC Human Rights 
Tribunal Decisions in 2010-16” (2019) 31 CJWL 293 [Hastie, “Tribunal Decisions”]. For a 
comparative analysis between Ontario and British Columbia, see Hastie, “Workplace Sexual 
Harassment”, supra note 5.
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not every negative incident or incident connected to sex constitutes harassment.26 
Moreover, a single comment or instance of verbal conduct is generally insufficient 
to establish harassment. A single comment may only be sufficient to ground a 
complaint where that comment is particularly egregious in nature.27 Often, this 
means that where verbal conduct is at issue, a pattern of conduct or repeated 
instances of conduct will be needed to establish the complaint.
Tribunals and courts have come to understand the legal test for determining 
whether conduct was “unwelcome” as “taking into account all the circumstances, 
would a reasonable person know that the conduct in question was not welcomed 
by the complainant?”28 The test thus asks whether the harasser knew, or ought to 
have known, that the conduct was not welcomed. The burden is on a complainant 
to establish this element of her complaint. However, this does not require a 
complainant to establish that they actively protested the conduct, such as through 
verbal communication.29 This has been affirmed in many cases, including recently 
in Ontario in Bento v. Manito’s Rotisserie & Sandwich: “[A] complaint, protest, 
or objection by an applicant is not a pre-condition to a finding of harassment and 
it does not mean that the behaviour or conduct wasn’t unwelcome.”30 Further, 
Mahmoodi makes clear that conduct may be both “tolerated and yet unwelcome 
at the same time.”31 Nonetheless, in some cases, issues arise where a complainant 
is unable to marshal some evidence of protest or objection, whether verbal or 
through more subtle physical gestures or facial expression.32
In response to shifting legal and social norms, recent case law from British 
Columbia suggests a trend towards increasing reliance on an objective assessment 
of whether the respondent ought to have known that their conduct would be 
“unwelcome”. This is most evident in the recent British Columbia Human Rights 
Tribunal decision in Basic v. Esquimalt Dental Clinic, where the Tribunal Chair 
formulated the test as: “[W]hat would reasonable people, who have taken the 
trouble to inform themselves on the topic of gender myths and stereotypes, know 
26. Eva Obo Others v Spruce Hill Resort and Another, 2018 BCHRT 238 at para 80 [Eva], citing 
Hadzic v Pizza Hut Canada (cob Pizza Hut), 1999 BCHRTD No 44 at para 33.
27. Pardo v School District No 43, 2003 BCHRT 71 [Pardo]. See Hastie, “Workplace Sexual 
Harassment”, supra note 5 at 20.
28. Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 140.
29. Ibid at paras 140-41.
30. 2018 HRTO 203 at para 108, citing SS v Taylor, 2012 HRTO 1839 at para 72.
31. Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 141.
32. See e.g. Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5 at 26-30; Hastie, “Unwelcome 
Requirement”, supra note 5 at 75-78.
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about the type of interactions that occurred?”33 Moreover, in The Employee v. The 
University and another (No. 2), the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal 
directly acknowledged the disproportionate burden the unwelcome element 
places on complainants, stating,
[i]t has been thirty years since  Janzen was decided, and it may be time to revisit 
whether this requirement unfairly places the burden of establishing a lack of consent 
on a complainant. Some argue there is support for moving to an affirmative consent 
standard that shifts the burden of proof to the respondent.34 
The requirement that the complainant establish that the alleged harasser knew 
or ought to have known that the conduct was “unwelcome” has been widely 
criticized for the inappropriate burden it places on complainants, predominantly 
women, to avoid harassment and protest harassing conduct.35 The individual 
and transactional focus of the test also minimizes the systemic nature of sexual 
harassment and gender-based discrimination in the workplace, as with other 
contexts.36 Moreover, as the next section will demonstrate, this element of sexual 
harassment law has further provided an entry point for gender-based myths 
and stereotypes to influence the legal analysis. The reliance on these myths and 
stereotypes is not unlike similar problems that have been widely documented 
in the context of sexual offences and gender-based violence in the criminal 
justice system.37 
33. Basic, supra note 17 at para 102.
34. 2020 BCHRT 12 at para 175.
35. See e.g. Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5; Hastie, “Unwelcome 
Requirement”, supra note 5; Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual Harassment”, supra note 
21 at 403 citing Marlene Kadar, “Sexual Harassment: Where We Stand; Research and Policy” 
(1983) 3 Windsor YB Access Just 358; Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 7 at 123-28; Gallivan, 
supra note 21 at 36; Fudge, supra note 21 at 244; Faraday, supra note 21 at 50; Sheppard, 
supra note 21 at 83; Kaitlyn Matulewicz, “Law’s Gendered Subtext: The Gender Order of 
Restaurant Work and Making Sexual Harassment Normal” (2016) 24 Fem Legal Stud 127.
36. See e.g. Hastie, “Tribunal Decisions”, supra note 25 at 299.
37. See Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”, supra note 8; Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, 
supra note 8; Randall, supra note 8. Myths regarding victim behaviour and women’s sexual 
availability have been used to undermine the credibility of female complainants of sexual 
assault in the criminal justice system. 
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B. ESTABLISHING “UNWELCOME” CONDUCT IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
COMPLAINTS: THE INTRODUCTION OF GENDER-BASED STEREOTYPES 
AND IMPLICATION OF CONSENT
The issues examined in this article are grounded by an in-depth case law analysis of 
sexual harassment complaints under human rights law.38 This study reviewed 191 
identified substantive decisions on the merits for workplace sexual harassment at 
the British Columbia and Ontario Human Rights Tribunals from 2000 to 2018.39 
In this study, I found that numerous cases raised concerns about the introduction 
of gender-based myths and stereotypes, particularly in relation to understandings 
of consent and establishing that the impugned conduct was “unwelcome.” This 
section discusses three ways in which the “unwelcome” element invites scrutiny 
of a complainant’s lack of protest or objection in assessing the complaint:40 first, 
where a lack of protest or objection is relied upon directly in determining that the 
conduct was not reasonably understood as “unwelcome”; second, where a lack of 
protest or objection is used to undermine the complainant’s credibility or version 
of events; and, third, where a lack of protest or objection is suggested to function 
akin to implied consent in settings where the alleged conduct is normalized 
in the workplace.
In some cases, a lack of protest or objection was directly considered as a factor 
in assessing whether it was reasonable for impugned conduct to be understood as 
“unwelcome”. For example, in Gibbons v. Sports Medicine Inc,41 while finding that 
certain physical conduct constituted sexual harassment,42 the Tribunal denied 
other aspects of the application. In particular, in assessing conduct that included 
a statement that commented on the complainant’s body and invited her to “a 
boat ride without her bikini top,” the adjudicator found that “in the absence 
of any protest by [the complainant], they did not in my view constitute sexual 
38. Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5. As a form of discrimination, human 
rights law and human rights tribunals are the central legal arena involved in adjudicating 
complaints of sexual harassment. Complaints of sexual harassment may be brought before a 
civil court where they relate to an independent legal claim subject to that jurisdiction, such as 
wrongful or constructive dismissal. Cases involving physical misconduct may also give way to 
criminal charges.
39. Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5 at 10.
40. See also ibid at 25-26. The “unwelcome” element also functions in ways that create obstacles 
for a complainant to establish her case and which raise doubts concerning her credibility 
based on related gender myths beyond the issue of protest or objection. These include issues 
related to normalizing sexual behaviour in the workplace, and participation by a complainant 
in prior or related behaviour in the workplace.
41. 2003 HRTO 26.
42. Ibid at para 32.
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harassment.”43 Here, the lack of express objection or active protest to conduct 
appeared instrumental in finding that such conduct was not sexual harassment. 
Similarly, in Wollstonecroft v. Crellin et al,44 the fact that the complainant did not 
object to the respondent’s discussion of sexual topics with her, and did not bring 
allegations until months later, was specifically mentioned by the adjudicator,45 
although the complaint was ultimately found justified.
In Anderson v. Law Help Ltd, the adjudicator appeared to rely on active 
protest as the pivotal point at which the respondent knew, or ought to have 
known, that his conduct was “unwelcome”.46 That case revolved substantially 
around a series of text messages. The applicant had not been “completely blunt in 
rejecting his sexual advances” in the beginning of the text exchanges.47 However, 
when she later attempted to end their exchange and “clearly explained why she 
was not interested in having a relationship with him,”48 the adjudicator found 
that, “[a]t that point, a reasonable person would have known that any further 
sexual advances would be unwelcome.”49 This suggests an interpretation of the 
“unwelcome” element that relies on active protest or objection.
These cases illustrate how a lack of active protest or objection may negatively 
influence the assessment of whether the conduct in question was understood to 
be “unwelcome”. This, in turn, impacts the complainant’s ability to establish the 
prima facie complaint, despite legal principles which suggest that active protest 
or objection is not required to meet this element of a complaint. Moreover, this 
focuses the inquiry on the complainant’s own behaviour in assessing the complaint. 
Though these analyses are not framed as whether or not the complainant 
consented to the conduct, requiring the complainant to establish the impugned 
conduct as “unwelcome,” and relying on evidence of active protest or objection in 
order to do so, effectively responsibilizes the complainant to clearly communicate 
non-consent. In other words, the “unwelcome” element, where it relies on some 
indicia of protest or objection, presumes, as a default, that such conduct would 
be “welcomed” and consented to, requiring the complainant to bear the burden 
of establishing a departure from this presumption or default position.
A lack of protest or objection may also function to undermine a complainant’s 
credibility. This may be especially so where a complainant’s character or 
43. Ibid at para 33.
44. 2000 BCHRT 37.
45. Ibid at para 84.
46. 2016 HRTO 1683.
47. Ibid at para 77.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
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narrative does not “fit” with assumptions about victim behaviour and the wider 
gender-based stereotypes to which they attach. For example, in Han v. Gwak 
and Nammi Immigration,50 while the adjudicator found that the individual 
respondent made comments of a sexual nature, it was also determined that the 
complainant was “a person with strong opinions, who is entirely capable of 
making her thoughts and feelings known,” and therefore that it was “unlikely 
that she would not have spoken to [the respondent] had his comments made her 
uncomfortable.”51 The adjudicator further surmised that it was therefore unlikely 
that the complainant had found the comments to be “unwelcome”.52 In this 
case, the complainant’s character may have influenced how her lack of protest or 
objection was interpreted and understood. Similarly, in Woods v. Fluid Creations, 
the tribunal member noted perceived inconsistencies in the complainant’s 
response to the alleged conduct, which negatively impacted her credibility.53 
Specifically, the tribunal member remarked that “the complainant’s assertion that 
she did not protest because she was a probationary employee does not explain 
why she said nothing to any co-worker. This alleged meekness seems inconsistent 
with the statement in her affidavit that she ‘spun around to face [Mr. McPhee] 
about to freak out on him and tell him off.’”54 
As Han and Woods illustrate, the search for, and reliance on, explanations 
for a lack of protest or objection that fit assumptions being drawn about the 
complainant’s personality or character, or about victim behaviour, may provide 
another entry point for the use of gender-based myths or stereotypes to 
influence the adjudication of the “unwelcome” requirement. This is particularly 
problematic given the many reasons why individuals are known not to complain 
or speak out when faced with sexual harassment, such as a fear for job security 
or of not being believed.55 These examples also point to the potential for implicit 
bias and assumption-based reasoning to influence the analysis and outcome of 
the complaint. These cases further entrench a link between the “unwelcome” 
element and a presumption of consent. They illustrate how an adjudicator’s 
own perspective or expectations about how an individual would or should react 
in similar circumstances may influence an assessment about whether and how 
that individual would communicate non-consent in particular settings. This 
50. 2009 BCHRT 17.
51. Ibid at para 35.
52. Ibid at para 70.
53. 2012 BCHRT 110.
54. Ibid at para 50; Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5 at 77.
55. See e.g. Sheryl L Johnson, Sexual Harassment in Canada: A Guide for Understanding and 
Prevention (LexisNexis Canada, 2017) at 195.
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may similarly operate to create a presumption of consent absent a compelling 
explanation and evidence to counter it.
A lack of protest or objection may also influence the understanding of 
whether the impugned conduct was “unwelcome” where a work environment 
is sexualized or particular conduct within it is normalized. In Dix v. The Twenty 
Theatre Company,56 the application included numerous incidents of alleged 
harassment. The Tribunal dismissed part of the application, which dealt with 
allegations of hugging and kissing in the workplace. The applicant alleged that two 
board members solicited hugs and kisses on the cheek from her.57 The adjudicator 
found that, in the context of this workplace, such behaviour was not uncommon, 
and as such, it was not reasonable for the respondents to know that their conduct 
was “unwelcome” absent express objection or active protest.58 In this analysis, 
the adjudicator acknowledged that there are “many work environments in the 
corporate world where hugging and cheek kissing are not the norm.”59 However, 
the adjudicator took the complainant’s particular work environment as a neutral 
backdrop, which suggests that the applicant would have had to actively protest 
this conduct in order for it to be understood as “unwelcome”. In that case, the 
applicant also raised an argument that an affirmative consent standard ought to 
be applied, which was rejected.60 
Similar to Dix, the complaint in Sleightholm v. Metrin and another (No. 3)61 
revolved around a workplace in which certain conduct was normalized. In that 
case, part of the complaint related to the sharing of a dream in which the 
complainant was in a bath. While the adjudicator acknowledged that “[t]he 
sharing of the ‘bath dream’ might easily be construed as amounting to sexual 
harassment” in another context, the fact that “dreams and the interpretation of 
them were frequently the subject of conversation” in this workplace, and that the 
complainant was “the instigator of many of these conversations,” changed things.62 
In addition, the complainant also described conduct that included hugging and 
blowing kisses. However, the adjudicator found that this did not constitute a 
breach of the Code, and that such behaviour “was normal for the office they were 
in and was not protested by her or any other employee.”63 While the adjudicator 
56. 2017 HRTO 394 [Dix].
57. Ibid at para 26.
58. See ibid at paras 32-36.
59. Ibid at para 33.
60. Ibid at para 35.
61. 2013 BCHRT 75.
62. Ibid at para 56.
63. Ibid at para 73.
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took issue with the complainant’s credibility for numerous other reasons, these 
passages suggest some reliance on indicia of protest or objection in assessing 
whether the conduct in question ought to have reasonably been understood as 
“unwelcome” in light of the particular organizational culture and behaviour. 
Like Dix, the workplace environment was taken as neutral backdrop, despite a 
recognition that such behaviour might otherwise constitute sexual harassment. 
As a result, both Dix and Sleightholm suggest that, where a respondent is able to 
lead evidence that the conduct complained of is “normal” in the particular work 
environment, there may be greater reliance on indicia of protest or objection in 
order to ground a finding that the conduct was “unwelcome”. 
The “unwelcome” element of sexual harassment law creates potential for 
many problematic interpretations associated with consent and credibility to 
influence the arguments, analysis, and outcome of a complaint. Most directly, the 
“unwelcome” element invites decision-makers to scrutinize a lack of active protest 
or clear objection to the impugned conduct in assessing whether the conduct was, 
or ought reasonably to have been, understood as “unwelcome”. This effectively 
places the burden of establishing a lack of consent with the complainant, and 
indirectly suggests that active protest or objection may, in fact, be required 
in order to establish a lack of consent in some circumstances. Indirectly, the 
“unwelcome” element also invites scrutiny of a complainant’s credibility, calling 
into question whether the impugned conduct occurred, and if it did, whether it 
was, in effect, consented to. For complainants who do not conform to perceived 
expectations of victim behaviour or gender-based stereotypes, the “unwelcome” 
element may create additional obstacles to establishing their complaint. 
Finally, the “unwelcome” element can function to create a presumption of 
consent in workplaces where particular conduct is normalized. In such cases, 
the “unwelcome” element may require a complainant to actively communicate 
non-consent, even where that conduct would be understood as presumptively 
“unwelcome” in another context.64 The emphasis placed on a lack of active 
protest or objection in establishing the “unwelcome” element creates a context in 
which complainants bear the burden of both communicating non-consent and 
marshalling evidence to that effect. Where they are unable to do so, they risk an 
interpretation that the impugned conduct will not reasonably be understood as 
“unwelcome”, that their credibility will be called into question, and that their 
complaint will possibly be dismissed. 
64. This has been particularly critiqued in relation to work in the restaurant industry. See 
Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual Harassment”, supra note 21.
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II. CONSENT AND SEXUAL CONDUCT IN CRIMINAL AND 
TORT LAW 
Both criminal and tort law have incorporated elements of affirmative consent 
for legal claims and offences concerning sexual misconduct. The shift towards 
affirmative consent in each of these legal arenas has been grounded by concerns 
about reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes, and on the impropriety 
of requiring a complainant to prove a lack of consent in certain circumstances. 
Examining the shifts towards affirmative consent in criminal and tort law 
provides important points of comparison in arguing for a similar shift for sexual 
harassment complaints under human rights law. In particular, I focus on how 
similar substantive problems support a structural shift in terms of who bears 
the burden to establish (non-)consent. Nonetheless, there are two obvious 
differences in the relevant laws under criminal and tort law, as opposed to human 
rights law, relating to the nature of the impugned conduct, and to the requisite 
element of intent. 
First, unlike human rights complaints, sexual offences under criminal law 
and the tort of battery are each limited to physical misconduct. Human rights 
complaints, including sexual harassment, encompass a wider range of misconduct, 
both in nature and degree of severity. However, this broader ambit does not 
detract from the purpose of the comparison made in this article, which is about 
who bears the burden of (dis)proving consent, and why that matters in light of 
identified concerns regarding reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes in 
the assessment of legal complaints in each of these arenas. 
Second, while intent features prominently in the criminal law governing 
sexual offences, and in relation to the tort of battery, it is not a required element 
for establishing a complaint in human rights law.65 However, this operates in a 
manner not dissimilar to the way in which intent is understood in tort law. Under 
intentional torts, like battery, a person must intend to bring about the material 
consequences of their conduct, but this does not necessarily require an intent 
to harm, or in other words, a malicious motive. Incidents of discrimination, 
particularly of sexual harassment, may be similarly understood in that the 
impugned conduct is a product of the respondent’s conscious mind, even if they 
do not understand it as discriminatory or harmful conduct. Further, as with 
the differences regarding impugned conduct, while the differences in relation 
to intent speak to the different purposes and functions of these areas of law, 
65. See e.g. BC Code, supra note 18, s 2.
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it does not impact significantly on the purpose of the comparison being made 
in this article. 
A. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT UNDER CRIMINAL LAW
Sexual offences in criminal law shifted to an affirmative consent standard in 
the mid-1990s.66 Widely documented issues regarding the propagation of rape 
myths and gender-based stereotypes in sexual assault trials were a motivating 
factor for this change. These myths included the “hue and cry” stereotype (the 
notion that “real victims” will fight back or immediately cry for help); the “real 
rape” stereotype (sexual assaults are committed by a stranger on an unsuspecting 
victim); and the “party girl” stereotype (that “bad girls” are more likely to 
consent).67 A number of changes to the criminal law have aimed to negate reliance 
on such myths and stereotypes in sexual assault trials, including the removal of 
the “recent complaint” requirement (which had allowed for an adverse inference 
on credibility to be drawn where a complainant did not disclose the assault at 
the first reasonable opportunity following the assault);68 the introduction of rape 
shield provisions (which restricted the ability to examine a complainant about 
their past sexual history in a sexual assault trial);69 the pronouncement in R v. 
Mills that the accused’s right to make full answer and defence does not permit 
counsel to use myths and stereotypes to “distort the truth-seeking goal of the trial 
process”;70 and the shift to affirmative consent.71
The essential elements of establishing a sexual offence, such as sexual assault, 
under the Criminal Code requires the Crown to establish that the complainant 
did not consent.72 The adoption of affirmative consent under criminal law does 
66. For a detailed review of relevant changes to criminal law as it relates to sexual assault, see 
Janine Benedet, “Judicial Misconduct in the Sexual Assault Trial” (2019) 52 UBC L Rev 1 
at 7-18. As Benedet explains, these included changes to evidentiary rules in the 1980s, and 
subsequent changes to consent law in the 1990s.
67. See Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 8 at 37; Ehrlich, supra note 8 at 391, citing 
Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard University Press, 1987); Elaine Craig, “The Relevance 
of Delayed Disclosure to Complainant Credibility in Cases of Sexual Offence” (2011) 36 
Queen’s LJ 551 [Craig, “Relevance of Delayed”]. See also Randall, “Ideal Victims”, supra note 
8 at 398; Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”, supra note 8; Rakhi Ruparelia, “Does 
No ‘No’ Mean Reasonable Doubt? Assessing the Impact of Ewanchuk on Determinations of 
Consent” (2006) 25 Can Woman Studies 167.
68. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 275 [Criminal Code].
69. Ibid, ss 276(1)(a)-276(1)(b).
70. [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 90.
71. Criminal Code, supra note 68, s 273.1(1).
72. Ibid, s 271; R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330 at para 23 [Ewanchuk].
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not operate to shift the burden of proof to an accused.73 Like any criminal 
offence, sexual offences are composed of both an actus reus and a mens rea, and 
the Crown must prove each beyond a reasonable doubt. For the purposes of actus 
reus, “consent” in cases of sexual offences means “that the complainant in her 
mind wanted the sexual touching to take place.”74 The focus is solely on what 
the complainant believed in her mind at the time. This creates space in which 
a complainant’s credibility and version of events can continue to be challenged, 
and in which gender-based myths and stereotypes may be introduced and relied 
upon in order to do so. 
For the purposes of mens rea, and whether the accused raises the defence 
of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, “consent” means that 
“the complainant had affirmatively communicated by words or conduct her 
agreement to engage in [the] sexual activity with the accused.”75 The focus here 
shifts to what the accused believed at the time the incident occurred, and whether 
the accused honestly believed that the complainant communicated consent—i.e., 
that the “complainant effectively said ‘yes’ through her words and/or actions.”76 
This formulation gives way to the defence of honest but mistaken belief, where 
evidence of affirmative consent is required for the accused to establish the defence. 
The Criminal Code adopted and first codified affirmative consent standards 
in 1992 when Parliament introduced Bill C-49,77 which defined and limited 
consent in sections 273.1(1) to 273.1(3), requiring that affirmative consent be 
given before engaging in sexual activity. Affirmative consent requires active and 
continuing communication of consent.78 Silence and passivity do not constitute 
consent; neither does ambiguous conduct.79 Contemporaneous, affirmative 
consent must be given for each and every sexual act regardless of the relationship.80 
73. The state is responsible for proving each element of a criminal offence. This burden lies with 
the Crown and never shifts to the accused. This is because every individual who is accused of 
a crime is entitled to be presumed innocent until proven guilty as guaranteed by the Charter. 
See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 11(d), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (describing a presumption that 
can only be displaced upon proof of the constituent elements beyond a reasonable doubt).
74. Ewanchuk, supra note 72 at para 48.
75. Ibid at para 49.
76. Ibid at para 47.
77. Criminal Code, supra note 68, s 265(4).
78. Ewanchuk, supra note 72 at paras 49, 51; R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at para 90 [Barton]; 
R v Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38 at para 44 [Goldfinch]; R v JA, 2011 SCC 28 at paras 34, 
47 [JA]; R v Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19 at para 27.
79. Ewanchuk, supra note 72 at para 51.
80. Goldfinch, supra note 78 at para 44; JA, supra note 78 at para 34.
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Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the Crown must still prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the complainant did not consent to the impugned conduct. While 
this does not require establishing active protest or objection, the complainant’s 
credibility and state of mind may continue to play a role in assessing this element 
of the offence, providing space in which gender-based myths and stereotypes may 
continue to be introduced and relied upon. 
An accused may raise the defence of honest but mistaken belief in 
communicated consent. This is a mistake of fact defence. A mistake of fact 
defence “operates where the accused mistakenly perceived facts that negate, 
or raise a reasonable doubt about, the fault element of the offence.”81 In order for 
the defence of mistaken belief to apply, the evidence must show that the accused 
“believed the complainant communicated consent to engage in the sexual activity 
in question.”82 In other words, the defendant must establish that he honestly 
believed that the complainant communicated consent, that she “said ‘yes’ through 
her words and/or actions.”83 
In order to avail himself of this defence, an accused must also show that he 
took “reasonable steps” to ascertain consent (section 273.2(b)).84 The reasonable 
steps requirement has both objective and subjective dimensions: The accused 
must take steps that are objectively reasonable to ascertain the consent of the 
complainant, and the reasonableness of those steps must be assessed in light 
of the circumstances known to the accused at the time.85 The purpose of the 
“reasonable steps” requirement was recently set out in Barton:
The purpose of the reasonable steps requirement has been expressed in different ways. 
The authors of Manning, Mewett & Sankoff: Criminal Law state that s. 273.2(b) of 
the Code seeks “to protect the security of the person and equality of women who 
comprise the huge majority of sexual assault victims by ensuring as much as possible 
that there is clarity on the part of both participants to a sexual act” (M. Manning and 
P. Sankoff, Manning, Mewett & Sankoff: Criminal Law (5th ed. 2015), at p. 1094 
(footnote omitted)). Abella J.A. (as she then was) wrote in Cornejo that the reasonable 
steps requirement “replaces the assumptions traditionally — and inappropriately — 
associated with passivity and silence” (para. 21). Professor Elizabeth Sheehy puts 
it this way: “Bill C-49’s ‘reasonable steps’ requirement was intended to criminalize 
sexual assaults committed by men who claim mistake without any effort to ascertain 
the woman’s consent or whose belief in consent relies on self-serving misogynist 
beliefs” (p. 492). The common thread running through each of these descriptions is 
81. Barton, supra note 78 at para 95, citing Pappajohn v the Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 120 at 148.
82. Ewanchuk, supra note 72 at para 46 [emphasis in original].
83. Ibid at para 47.
84. Criminal Code, supra note 68.
85. Barton, supra note 78 at para 104.
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this: the reasonable steps requirement rejects the outmoded idea that women can be 
taken to be consenting unless they say “no”.86
In Barton, Justice Moldaver noted that any steps taken that are “based on rape 
myths or stereotypical assumptions about women and consent cannot constitute 
reasonable steps.”87 The reasonable steps requirement buttresses the shift to 
affirmative consent by explicitly removing the ability for an accused to rely 
on silence, passivity, or perhaps even “mixed signals,” as well as gender-based 
stereotypes, in order to justify their conduct. This requirement thus clearly and 
finitely rejects any continued reliance on express rejection or communications of 
non-consent as relevant, let alone pivotal, in determining consent in the context 
of sexual assault. This is an important mechanism to better ensure that affirmative 
consent is effective as a legal principle.
Further buttressing the shift to affirmative consent is the principle that the 
defence of mistaken belief will not apply where the mistake is one of law, including 
in relation to “what counts as consent.”88 Mistakes of law include: that unless a 
woman says “no,” she has implicitly given her consent (i.e., “implied consent”);89 
that because a woman consented once, she will always consent again (i.e., “broad 
consent”);90 and that because a woman is sexually active, she is more likely to 
have consented to the sexual activity in question (i.e., “propensity to consent”).91 
The legal principles surrounding affirmative consent in sexual assault law—
including that mistaken belief can only form a valid defence where the accused 
took reasonable steps to ascertain consent, and that it does not apply in cases of 
mistake of law (including what counts as consent)—evidence a clear rejection of 
reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes, as well as an acknowledgment 
of the ways in which these myths and stereotypes have previously arisen and 
have been used problematically in relation to sexual assault trials and the issue of 
consent. As noted above, however, the requirement under criminal law for the 
Crown to prove that the complainant did not consent as part of its prima facie case 
continues to facilitate the introduction of gender-based myths and stereotypes. 
86. Ibid at para 105.
87. Ibid at para 107.
88. Ibid at para 96.
89. Ibid at para 98.
90. JA, supra note 78.
91. R v Seaboyer, [1991] 2 SCR 577.
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B. CONSENT AS A DEFENCE IN TORT LAW
In Scalera, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the nature of the 
relationship between sexual battery and consent in the context of an insurance 
indemnification and duty to defend dispute.92 At the time of this decision, it was 
well established that the intentional tort of battery treated consent as a defence 
that it was incumbent on a defendant to establish in order to alleviate themselves 
of liability. In Scalera, the arguments put forth required the Court to determine 
whether sexual battery was distinct in ways that justified a departure from the 
general treatment of consent in intentional torts.93 The majority and dissenting 
opinions disagreed on the issue of consent, and specifically on whether it should 
continue to operate as a defence in the context of sexual battery, or whether 
it should form part of the prima facie case that the plaintiff has the burden to 
prove.94 In other words, the question before the Supreme Court was whether 
to treat sexual battery distinctly from battery, and whether, in turn, to depart 
from the established principle that consent is a defence for the defendant in an 
intentional tort claim to establish.
The majority concluded that there was no principled reason to depart from 
the ordinary legal principles governing battery and the defence of consent. The 
majority relied on four arguments in this respect: first, maintaining consent as 
a defence makes sense given the relative positions of the parties;95 second, the 
underlying objectives and purposes of tort law, and of battery, are best served 
by maintaining consent as a defence;96 third, the requirement for contact to be 
“harmful or offensive” does not equate with it being prima facie non-consensual 
(and thus, part of the plaintiff’s case to prove);97 and, fourth, shifting the burden 
of proof to the plaintiff for sexual battery would give rise to potential issues 
around “victim-blaming” known to exist in criminal law.98
Writing for the majority, Justice McLachlin drew on well-established 
principles governing the intentional tort of battery to ground the conclusion 
that consent is a defence to the intentional tort of sexual battery, and that the 
plaintiff need only prove direct and intentional physical contact or interference 
92. Scalera, supra note 9. Scalera remains the sole leading authority on this issue.
93. Ibid at paras 1-36, 53, 95-109.
94. Ibid at paras 1-36, 103-109.
95. Ibid at para 13.
96. Ibid at paras 8-11.
97. Ibid at paras 17-26.
98. Ibid at paras 28-34.
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with her person to make out the prima facie claim.99 In the majority’s view, the 
tort of battery “is based on protecting individuals’ right to personal autonomy.”100 
The tort of battery “starts from the presumption that apart from the usual and 
inevitable contacts of ordinary life, each person is entitled not to be touched….
The sexual touching itself, absent the defendant showing lawful excuse, constitutes 
the violation….”101 As such, a direct interference with an individual’s physical 
integrity, whether of a sexual nature or otherwise, constitutes the prima facie tort 
and, as the majority notes, “the onus shifts to the person who is alleged to have 
violated the right to justify the intrusion.”102
While part of the majority’s reasoning relies on the direct and immediate 
nature of the conduct in relation to the injury,103 the reasons also focus on the 
relative positions between the parties. As Justice McLachlin notes, “the defendant 
is likely to know how and why the interference occurred….[I]f the defendant 
is in a position to say what happened, it is both sensible and just to give him 
an incentive to do so by putting the burden of explanation on him.”104 These 
reasons are particularly compelling in considering who should bear the burden 
of establishing consent. This approach focuses attention on the defendant to 
justify their conduct and explain the reasons underlying their behaviour. Notably, 
this aligns with the requirements and purpose of the honest but mistaken belief 
defence in criminal law.
While the dissenting opinion would have imported a fault-based requirement, 
such that the plaintiff would be required to establish that the defendant knew or 
ought to have known that she was not consenting to the conduct, the majority 
rejects this, noting that such an approach would “subordinate the plaintiff’s right 
to protection from invasions of her physical integrity to the defendant’s freedom 
to act.”105 In other words, making the plaintiff prove fault—in this case, a lack 
of consent—privileges and prioritizes the defendant’s “freedom to act” over the 
plaintiff’s right to physical integrity. In areas of law, like torts and human rights, 
where the central focus is on remedying wrongs and harms caused to persons, 
the interests of the person who has experienced the harm or wrong (the plaintiff 
under tort law, or complainant under human rights law) should be prioritized. 
99. Ibid at para 7.
100. Ibid at para 10.
101. Ibid at para 22.
102. Ibid at para 10.
103. Ibid at para 11.
104. Ibid at para 13, citing Ruth Sullivan, “Trespass to the Person in Canada: A Defence of the 
Traditional Approach” (1987) 19 Ottawa L Rev 533 at 563.
105. Scalera, supra note 9 at para 10, citing Sullivan, supra note 104 at 546.
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A fault-based approach that requires the plaintiff to establish a lack of consent 
would create the opposite situation and thus depart in unjustifiable ways from 
the underlying objectives and functions of the law. Rather, where the plaintiff can 
establish the interference, and therefore the violation of their autonomy “[t]he 
law may then fairly call upon the person thus implicated to explain, if he can.”106 
Similar justifications exist in human rights law, given its core purpose of 
remedying discrimination experienced by individuals.
Turning to the issue of consent and gender-based stereotyping, the majority 
summarizes the main argument against treating consent as a defence in respect 
of sexual battery:
The proposition that the law should require a plaintiff in an action for sexual battery 
to prove that she did not consent, is supported, it is suggested, by a requirement that 
the contact involved in battery must be harmful or offensive. The argument may be 
summarized as follows. The plaintiff must prove all the essential elements of the tort 
of battery. One of these is that the contact complained of was inherently harmful or 
offensive on an objective standard. Consensual sexual contact is neither harmful nor 
offensive. Therefore the plaintiff, in order to make out her case, must prove that she 
did not consent or that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not 
have thought she consented.107
This argument relies on the “non-trivial” threshold of contact that constitutes 
battery. In other words, battery generally provides a legal claim for “non-trivial” 
contact, which this argument suggests should be equated with “harmful or 
offensive” contact. While the majority agrees that contact meeting the threshold 
for the tort of battery must be “harmful or offensive,” this does not equate with 
“non-consensual.”108 The assertion that battery requires “harmful or offensive” 
contact “reflects the needs to exclude from battery the casual contacts inevitable 
in ordinary life”;109 it does not seek to communicate a requirement that “the 
contact was physically or psychologically injurious or morally offensive.”110
The majority reminds that “[i]f one accepts that the foundation of the tort 
of battery is a violation of personal autonomy, it follows that all contact outside 
the exceptional category of contact that is generally accepted or expected in the 
course of ordinary life, is prima facie offensive.”111 From that, then, the question 
106. Scalera, supra note 9 at para 15.
107. Ibid at para 17. A version of this argument is also relied upon in the dissenting opinion. See 
ibid at para 53.
108. Ibid at para 18.
109. Ibid at para 22.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid at para 18.
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becomes whether sexual conduct comes within the “exceptional category” 
of generally accepted or expected conduct. The majority finds that clearly it does 
not.112 As the majority concludes:
The sort of conduct the cases envision is the inevitable contact that goes with 
ordinary human activity, like brushing someone’s hand in the course of exchanging 
a gift, a gratuitous handshake, or being jostled in a crowd. Sexual contact does not 
fall into this category. It is not the casual, accidental or inevitable consequence of 
general human activity and interaction.113 
The majority opinion in Scalera explicitly addressed issues regarding victim-blaming 
and the inappropriate shift in inquiry that would result from requiring a plaintiff 
to prove a lack of consent to sexual battery.114 It further drew on established 
lessons from criminal law in this regard. In particular, the majority notes, quoting 
Bruce Feldthusen, that “enquiries into alleged consent have allowed the focus of 
the criminal trial to shift from the actions of the defendant to the character of 
the complainant. The same potential exists in tort law.”115 The majority articulates 
what this would look like in the context of requiring a plaintiff to prove a lack of 
consent in the prima facie claim for sexual battery:
[b]y requiring the plaintiff to prove more than the traditional battery claim requires, 
we inappropriately shift the focus of the trial from the defendant’s behaviour to the 
plaintiff’s character. Requiring the plaintiff to prove that a reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant would have known that she was not consenting requires her 
to justify her actions. In practical terms, she must prove that she made it clear through 
her conduct and words that she did not consent to the sexual contact. Her conduct, not 
the defendant’s, becomes the primary focus from the outset. If she cannot prove 
these things, she will be non-suited and the defendant need never give his side of 
the story.116 
This is significant as the very same issue and result can, and does, appear in sexual 
harassment complaints, as demonstrated earlier. The majority further buttresses 
this conclusion through express reference to Parliament’s views in amending 
criminal law to adopt an affirmative consent model for sexual offences, which the 
112. Ibid at paras 18-22.
113. Ibid at para 21.
114. Ibid at paras 28-34.
115. Ibid at para 28 [emphasis in original], citing Bruce Feldthusen, “The Canadian Experiment 
with the Civil Action for Sexual Battery” in Nicholas J Mullany, ed, Torts in the Nineties 
(LBC Information Services, 1997) 274 at 282.
116. Scalera, supra note 9 at para 30 [emphasis added].
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majority states as a move to “counteract the historic tendency of criminal trials 
for sexual assault to focus unduly on the behaviour of the complainant.”117
As Part III takes up in greater detail, the analysis and conclusion that consent 
is properly viewed as a defence in sexual battery claims under tort law, coupled 
with the shift towards an affirmative consent standard in criminal law, provide a 
firm foundation to argue for a similar shift in sexual harassment law, one which 
would be adequately effected by removing the “unwelcome” element.
III. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF (DIS)PROVING 
“UNWELCOME” CONDUCT IN SEXUAL  
HARASSMENT LAW
As seen in the criminal law and tort law contexts, where a complainant bears the 
burden of proving a lack of consent, this inevitably shifts the focus of the inquiry 
towards her character and conduct, rather than focusing on the defendant’s 
conduct and its impact on the complainant. Part I of this article illustrated 
how the “unwelcome” element of the test for sexual harassment may operate 
to effectively require a complainant to establish a lack of consent, and how that 
has manifested in ways which scrutinize the complainant’s own character and 
behaviour rather than focusing on the respondent’s conduct. The “unwelcome” 
element, both in principle and in practice, produces problematic consequences 
for complainants of sexual harassment under human rights law. Specifically, 
the “unwelcome” element allows for the introduction of gender-based myths 
and stereotypes that may negatively influence the analysis and outcome of the 
complaint. These stereotypes arise where there is a presumption of consent, 
where a complainant is required to disprove her consent, or where her response 
is less than a clear and unequivocal rejection of sexual advances, and they may be 
used to cast suspicion on the complainant’s credibility. 
The shift towards affirmative consent in criminal law and the affirmation of 
consent as a defence to sexual battery in tort law were each grounded in response 
to the problematic consequences associated with gender-based stereotyping in 
relation to instances of sexual misconduct. The examinations of criminal and 
tort law’s approaches to consent provide support for rejecting the “unwelcome” 
element in sexual harassment complaints. The comparison functions to illustrate, 
first, that similar problems concerning gender-based stereotyping arise when 
the burden of disproving consent rests with a complainant in legal complaints 
117. Ibid at para 32.
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involving sexual misconduct across an array of bodies of law and, second, that 
consistent approaches to the burden for establishing consent across these legal 
arenas can similarly work to ameliorate those problems.
The boundaries created by strict conduct and intent elements in both 
criminal and tort law supported the courts’ and legislatures’ legal approaches to 
consent in those arenas. Nonetheless, while criminal and tort law have narrower 
boundaries in defining legal claims and offences, these are inherently connected 
to their purposes and functions within the larger legal system. Human rights law 
similarly creates appropriate boundaries around what constitutes discrimination 
in a manner consistent with advancing its purpose and function. As such, 
it can readily provide sufficient boundaries around sexual harassment as a form 
of discrimination without continued reliance on the “unwelcome” element in 
establishing the prima facie complaint.
To begin, it is important to explain that the test for sexual harassment 
deviates from the general test for discrimination under human rights law. 
In a discrimination complaint, a complainant must generally establish: (1) 
that they have a protected characteristic (such as, for the purposes of a sexual 
harassment complaint: sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, 
marital or family status);118 (2) that they experienced an adverse impact or 
treatment; and (3) that their protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse 
impact or treatment.119 Unlike the test for sexual harassment, the general test for 
discrimination does not require a complainant to establish that the adverse impact 
or treatment they experienced was “unwelcome,” nor is consent raised as an issue 
in other indirect ways in the prima facie complaint. Rather, a respondent may 
be excused from liability where they can establish justification for the impugned 
conduct, such as where a job criterion is a “bona fide occupational requirement” 
or where the respondent can establish that they accommodated the complainant 
to the point of undue hardship.120 
These existing legal principles governing discrimination complaints, coupled 
with existing constraints on defining relevant conduct in sexual harassment 
118. For a list of relevant protected grounds in the employment context, see e.g. BC Code, supra 
note 18, s 13; Ontario Code, supra note 18, ss 5(1)-5(2), 7(2).
119. Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 [Moore].
120. See e.g. ibid at para 49; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para 
37 [Bombardier].
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complaints,121 are sufficient to respond to sexual harassment complaints 
without a continued reliance on the additional burden of establishing that 
the impugned conduct (or “adverse treatment”) was “unwelcome”. In a case 
of sexual harassment, the protected characteristic factor does not raise unique 
concerns. Similarly, establishing a nexus between the protected characteristic and 
the adverse treatment is unlikely, in the context of sexual harassment, to create 
distinct issues, given the sexual nature of the misconduct typically at issue.122 The 
crux of the uncertainty in incorporating sexual harassment under the general 
test for discrimination is located within the second element, identifying what 
constitutes “adverse treatment.” This is where the “unwelcome” element has 
historically served as a boundary or threshold element. However, as human 
rights law and the test for discrimination have evolved significantly in the past 
few decades, existing principles and interpretations are sufficient to operate as a 
boundary or threshold without the “unwelcome” element, and in a manner that 
arguably better advances the underlying purposes of human rights law.
The above proposal, that sexual harassment complaints can be properly dealt 
with under the general test for discrimination, will inevitably raise concerns, 
similar to those seen in criminal and tort law, about whether such a proposal 
improperly expands the ambit or reach of the law, or would open the “floodgates” 
of litigation. I offer four responses. First, the underlying purposes of human rights 
law justify a broader ambit of conduct that may be captured as discrimination, 
making the wider scope compatible with the nature and function of human rights 
law. Second, existing principles setting out the threshold of what constitutes 
discriminatory conduct and “adverse treatment” function to create sufficient 
boundaries in light of the purposes of human rights law. Third, concerns about 
opening the floodgates of complaints and false complaints by consenting sexual 
partners are unwarranted, both because existing legal and procedural principles 
attending human rights law sufficiently guard against such claims and because 
such concerns, to an extent, propagate gender-based stereotypes. Finally, insofar 
as consent and “welcomed” conduct will remain an aspect of sexual harassment 
complaints, it can and should be treated as a justification, the burden of which is 
on the respondent to establish.
121. As described in Part I of this article, above. See Pardo, supra note 27 (the requirement for 
persistent conduct in cases of verbal complaint); Eva, supra note 26 (the principle that not all 
negative interactions will constitute a sufficient adverse impact).
122. For a discussion of this element of sexual harassment law in British Columbia, see Hastie, 
“Tribunal Decisions”, supra note 25. See also Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, 
supra note 5 (discussing this element in British Columbia and Ontario case law 
from 2000 to 2018).
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Turning first to the underlying purposes of human rights law, this body of 
law is seen as “quasi-constitutional”123 and derived from the guarantee of equality 
under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Human rights 
codes, as statutory instruments, typically set out a variety of purposes, including 
to foster equality and inclusion, promote human dignity, prevent discrimination, 
and address inequality.124 Human rights complaints, as a vehicle through which 
individuals may seek redress for discriminatory or unequal treatment, are focused 
squarely on the impact to the complainant,125 reflecting a core remedial purpose 
for human rights law. Focusing on the impact to the complainant in assessing a 
discrimination complaint, as reflected in the requirement for a complainant to 
establish that they experienced adverse treatment, properly focuses the inquiry on 
the discriminatory treatment and its consequences for a complainant. In light of 
this, legal principles like the “unwelcome” element under sexual harassment law, 
which invite scrutiny of a complainant’s own behaviour, not only detract from, 
but risk undermining, this core purpose. Further, given that human rights law 
is centrally concerned with the impact on the complainant, it makes sense that 
intent to discriminate is not a requirement, only the effect of discrimination. 
Finally, the core remedial or compensatory focus of human rights law, as focused 
on the complainant, necessitates a broad ambit of misconduct to be captured, 
which itself reflects the reality that discrimination takes myriad and often 
insidious forms. 
In light of the underlying core remedial purpose of human rights law, 
existing legal principles have developed to properly identify the boundaries 
of what misconduct constitutes discrimination and what falls below that 
threshold. These existing legal principles can, and already do, apply to sexual 
harassment complaints. Sexual harassment law has developed to create unique 
and, as I have argued, heightened standards for establishing discrimination. 
This heightened standard is unnecessary in light of the general legal principles 
that apply to discrimination complaints. Moreover, the heightened standard is 
harmful, given the ways in which the “unwelcome” element invites a reliance on 
gender-based myths and stereotypes, and improperly focuses the inquiry on the 
complainant’s own conduct. 
123. See e.g. Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v Newfoundland (Green Bay Health Care 
Centre), [1996] 2 SCR 3 at para 20.
124. See e.g. BC Code, supra note 18, s 3; Ontario Code, supra note 18, preamble.
125. See e.g. British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at paras 
87-90, Abella J. 
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In general, it is a well-established principle under human rights law that 
not all negative remarks, comments, or conduct constitute discrimination.126 
Thus, human rights law already sets boundaries around conduct in a manner 
not dissimilar to the tort of battery’s threshold for “non-trivial” contact. Second, 
the requirement for a complainant to establish adverse treatment or an adverse 
impact means that only misconduct that has a demonstrable negative impact on a 
complainant will constitute discrimination. This “adverse treatment” or “adverse 
impact” element often takes the form of a penalty, exclusion, or differential 
treatment.127 This element of the general test for discrimination sets an important 
boundary and threshold around complaints of all kinds, guarding against 
“floodgates” concerns without inappropriately shifting the focus of the inquiry 
onto the complainant’s own behaviour or conduct.
When assessing sexual harassment complaints, and examining the alleged 
discriminatory conduct, physical conduct is unlikely to generate significant 
ambiguity or concern, as it is more readily understood as presumptively 
inappropriate.128 The challenge in advancing an argument to reject the 
“unwelcome” element is more likely to arise in assessing verbal conduct. As with 
other forms of verbal misconduct, there is a presumption of persistence required 
to meet the threshold of sexual harassment under human rights law. This means 
that, absent exceptional circumstances (set out in Pardo), for verbal misconduct 
or harassment to constitute discrimination (whether based on sex or other 
protected characteristics), it must generally be repeated behaviour.129 In other 
words, not all negative comments will automatically constitute discrimination 
or sexual harassment, whether assessed under current sexual harassment law 
or under the general test for discrimination. Importantly, this legal principle 
maintains an established threshold in establishing discriminatory conduct, 
including verbal sexual harassment, without the need to require a complainant 
to also establish that such conduct was “unwelcome.” This approach aligns with 
the core remedial purpose of human rights law and its focus on impact, while 
also maintaining a threshold that guards against frivolous claims and preserves 
administrative resources.
126. See e.g. Eva, supra note 26 at para 80. Eva held that “not every negative incident that is 
connected to sex will be discriminatory” (citing Hadzic v Pizza Hut Canada (cob Pizza Hut), 
1999 BCHRT 44). 
127. See e.g. Bombardier, supra note 120 at para 42.
128. See Hastie, “Tribunal Decisions”, supra note 25.
129. See Eva, supra note 26 at para 80, citing Pardo, supra note 27 at para 12.
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The greatest objection to removing the “unwelcome” element from sexual 
harassment complaints under human rights law is likely to come in the form of 
the “floodgates” concern. In one iteration or another, this objection essentially 
boils down to concerns that, without this element, human rights tribunals 
will be flooded with an unmanageable number of claims; the removal of this 
requirement would unreasonably enlarge the legal definition of what constitutes 
sexual harassment; or the removal of this element will generate an increased 
number of frivolous or unmeritorious claims. 
The removal of the “unwelcome” element and incorporation of 
sexual harassment under the general test for discrimination is unlikely to 
unreasonably enlarge the legal definition of sexual harassment. This is because, 
as I have discussed above, the existing legal principles governing what misconduct 
constitutes discrimination (including sexual harassment), coupled with the 
requirement for a complainant to demonstrate adverse treatment or impact, 
creates sufficient boundaries around what is, and is not, discrimination under 
human rights law, including in respect of sexual harassment. The “unwelcome” 
element, which represents the key departure in sexual harassment law from 
general anti-discrimination law, does not create further boundaries around what 
constitutes sexually harassing conduct, nor on what constitutes an adverse impact. 
It effectively requires a complainant to establish, in addition to those elements, 
a lack of consent. This is an element that individuals bringing other discrimination 
complaints are generally not required to establish.130 There is no principled reason 
to be concerned that the proposed shift would substantially enlarge the definition 
of what constitutes sexual harassment. There is also no evidentiary basis to be 
concerned about an unmanageable volume of complaints. Again, discrimination 
complaints outside of sexual harassment have well-developed processes and legal 
principles, and they have not produced these issues. Thus, there is no principled 
reason to treat sexual harassment complaints differently from other discrimination 
complaints—a conclusion similarly reached in Scalera in rejecting differential 
treatment of sexual battery from the general tort of battery.
130. See Ontario Code, supra note 18. The Ontario Code defines “harassment” under section 10 
and includes the “unwelcome” element. Under the Ontario Code, harassment is prohibited in 
a number of contexts and individuals claiming harassment in other contexts may be similarly 
required to establish that the impugned conduct was “unwelcome.” See Janzen, supra note 1. 
Racial harassment, specifically, has historically adopted this definitional element from Janzen 
and would similarly benefit from its removal. For an analysis of racial harassment claims, 
see e.g. Michael Hall, “Racial Harassment in Employment: An Assessment of the Analytical 
Approaches” (2006) 13 CLELJ 229.
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Second, regardless of the potential volume of complaints, the “floodgates” 
argument often centres on the specter of frivolous and unmeritorious complaints 
in relation to sexual misconduct and sex equality. This is particularly troubling as 
such arguments implicitly propagate the very gender-based stereotypes that legal 
and policy reforms aim to ameliorate. As the Court in Scalera noted, when faced 
with a similar argument, 
[f ]ew plaintiffs to consensual sex or in situations where consent is a reasonable 
inference from the circumstances, are likely to sue if they are virtually certain to 
lose when the facts come out. Moreover, the rules of court provide sanctions for 
vexatious litigants. There is no need to change the law of battery to avoid vexatious 
claims.131 
Similarly, concerns that vindictive (female) colleagues will bring frivolous or false 
discrimination complaints against their (male) counterparts are unwarranted. 
First, as with civil courts, most individuals are not likely to bring frivolous 
or unmeritorious claims to a human rights tribunal; they are likely to lose 
such claims and expend considerable resources in the process. Second, the 
suggestion that sexual harassment complainants are more or uniquely likely 
to bring frivolous or false complaints, as compared with other complainants 
of discrimination, implicitly relies on problematic gender-based stereotypes of 
women as vindictive and vengeful, not dissimilar to the historical stereotyping 
relied on in the criminal justice system and other contexts. Third, as with 
civil courts, there are well-developed procedures in place to address frivolous, 
vexatious, and unmeritorious complaints in the human rights system.132 There 
131. Scalera, supra note 9 at para 24.
132. In direct access jurisdictions like British Columbia and Ontario, complaints may be screened 
at a preliminary stage, and may be dismissed on preliminary application where they have 
“no chance of success”: see BC Code, supra note 18, s 27(1)(c); “Human Rights Tribunal of 
Ontario Rules of Procedure” (2017) online (pdf ): Tribunals Ontario <tribunalsontario.ca/
documents/hrto/Practice%20Directions/HRTO%20Rules%20of%20Procedure.html> at 
Rule 19A. Further, direct access jurisdictions typically adopt an early intervention approach 
where adjudicators oversee a complaint from the early stages and may further advise on 
the matter: see “Applicant’s Guide to Filing an Application with the HRTO”, online (pdf ): 
Tribunals Ontario <tribunalsontario.ca/documents/hrto/Guides/Applicants%20Guide.
html#8e>; “Steps in the Human Rights Complaints Process”, online (pdf ): BC Human 
Rights Tribunal <www.bchrt.bc.ca/complaint-process/steps.htm>. In other jurisdictions, 
a Human Right Commission similarly functions to screen applications at an early stage, 
providing opportunity for dismissal of a complaint following a preliminary investigation: 
see e.g. “The Complaint Process”, online (pdf ): Manitoba Human Rights Commission 
<www.manitobahumanrights.ca/v1/complaints/complaints-filing-a-complaint.html>; 
“How the Commission Intervenes”, online (pdf ): Commission des Droits de la Personne 
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is, as above, no principled reason to be concerned uniquely or differently about 
sexual harassment complainants so as to justify the imposition of an additional 
legal burden in establishing their complaint on this basis.
Overall, there is no principled basis upon which to continue to treat sexual 
harassment complaints distinctly from other discrimination complaints under 
existing human rights legislation. Moreover, to maintain a distinction will be 
to maintain a higher threshold for establishing sexual harassment as a form of 
discrimination, as compared to other forms of discrimination. Eliminating such 
a distinction would further advance sex equality in the workplace. As Schultz 
has noted, for example, the distinct legal treatment of sexual harassment has 
encouraged a narrow construction of workplace issues as centred on sexual 
misconduct, diverting attention away from broader and deeper recognition of sex 
inequality in the workplace.133 Eliminating this distinction may, in turn, broaden 
the focus of sex-based discrimination issues in the workplace, and complaints 
under the human rights law system. This would, in turn, work towards greater 
sex equality in the workplace.
Finally, turning to the issue of where and how consent should be dealt 
with under human rights law, existing legal principles that allow a respondent 
to provide justification for their conduct afford a more appropriate space in 
which to consider this issue. If a complainant establishes a prima facie claim 
of discrimination, the onus shifts to the defendant to justify their conduct 
based on exemptions under relevant legislation and principles developed by the 
courts.134 Courts have historically developed justification principles related to 
bona fide occupational requirements and accommodation issues in the context 
of employment.135 Nonetheless, courts and tribunals could similarly develop 
principles that would allow a respondent to justify their conduct on the basis of a 
reasonable belief that the conduct was “welcomed” or consented to in the context 
of sexual harassment. For example, tribunals could adopt and adapt a test similar 
to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in criminal law. This would allow a 
respondent to justify their conduct where they took reasonable steps to ascertain 
the consent of the complainant or had a reasonable basis to believe their conduct 
was welcomed. The primary change in law proposed here is about who bears the 
burden of establishing consent vis-à-vis the “unwelcome” element. 
et des Droits de la Jeunesse <www.cdpdj.qc.ca/en/file-a-complaint/complaints-process/
how-commission-intervenes>.
133. See Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”, supra note 14 at 66.
134. See e.g. Bombardier, supra note 120 at para 37.
135. See e.g. Moore, supra note 119 at para 49.
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Similar to the approaches in criminal and tort law, respondents in a 
sexual harassment complaint should bear the onus of establishing consent 
or “welcomeness” in relation to their conduct. The burden of proof under 
this approach is placed with the defendant (or, in the human rights context, 
the respondent) who is, as the Court in Scalera noted, in the best position to 
explain their conduct and the motivations behind it. Importantly, shifting 
claims regarding consent to the justification stage minimizes the space in which 
gender-based stereotypes and myths can be introduced and relied upon as a 
way to directly undermine the prima facie claim. This is not a perfect solution, 
however, and criminal law scholars in particular have noted the ways in which 
gender-based stereotypes continue to surface in sexual assault cases.136 
Affirmative consent-like principles come with their own set of challenges 
and critiques.137 Concepts of affirmative consent, as examined especially in 
criminal law contexts, risk oversimplifying experiences of sexual encounters and 
behaviour.138 As such, these concepts risk being both over- and under-inclusive in 
regulating sexual activity,139 and may communicate troubling moral judgments, 
both about women’s sexuality and about ideas of women as vulnerable subjects.140 
In similar ways, human rights law must be attentive to the normative judgments 
it communicates and the ways in which these may pre-emptively shape social 
behaviour, such as behaviour in the workplace.141 However, in light of the 
documented problems arising from the current formulation of sexual harassment 
law and the ways it impacts women, in particular, who do bring forward 
legal complaints, the structural shift of who bears the burden of establishing 
“welcomeness” is an important one to undertake. This would help alleviate 
the focus of the inquiry from the complainant’s own conduct and credibility 
and shift it towards the respondent’s conduct and motivations. This shift may 
work towards minimizing the use of and reliance on gender-based stereotypes 
in a discrimination complaint. It would also alleviate the heightened burden 
that complainants of sexual harassment face as compared to those bringing 
discrimination complaints on other bases. Finally, such a shift may create 
larger space, both within and beyond the human rights law and adjudication 
136. See e.g. Ruparelia, supra note 67; Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 8; Hastie, 
“Unwelcome Requirement”, supra note 5.
137. See e.g. Gruber, supra note 10 at 430; Halley, Split Decisions, supra note 10; Halley, 
“Affirmative Consent”, supra note 12 at 259; Matthews, supra note 11 at 275. 
138. See e.g. Matthews, supra note 11 at 275.
139. See ibid at 275-80.
140. See e.g. Halley, “Affirmative Consent”, supra note 12 at 259.
141. See e.g. Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”, supra note 14 at 66-67.
HASTIE,  AN UNWELCOME BURDEN 451
system, to engage in dialogue about appropriate workplace boundaries, sexual 
behavior, and regulatory approaches to this, for which existing scholarship has 
highlighted a need.142
Moreover, as “welcomeness” might be construed as a more flexible concept 
than consent, the cautionary lessons to be learned from existing scholarship 
that critique affirmative consent should be borne in mind. For example, some 
critiques highlight the problems associated with establishing consent under a 
binary “yes or no” formulation.143 Similarly, others draw attention to the ways 
in which individuals may hold different understandings of what evidence or 
behaviour constitutes consent.144 Requiring a respondent to establish that they 
had a reasonable belief that their conduct was “welcomed” may allow for a more 
nuanced consideration of evidence or facts, as it does not necessarily require a 
binary approach to analysis, and provides space for a respondent to communicate 
their subjective understanding of the situation and motivation for their 
behaviour. Human rights law also operates more flexibly regarding evidentiary 
standards, which may allow for a more flexible approach to the analysis in this 
regard. However, while these factors may provide a partial response to critiques 
of affirmative consent as it has operated in criminal law contexts, it is not a 
perfect solution. Yet, insofar as a consent-like factor will remain a feature of 
sexual harassment law, the burden ought to rest with the respondent, rather than 
the complainant, to establish this.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has argued for a shift in sexual harassment law that removes the 
requirement for a complainant to establish that the impugned conduct was 
“unwelcome.” The “unwelcome” element has been critiqued for placing an 
inappropriate burden on women to avoid harassment in the workplace, for 
inviting improper scrutiny into a complainant’s own conduct in a complaint, 
and for facilitating the use of gender-based stereotypes and myths in assessing a 
sexual harassment complaint. The use of, and reliance on, gender-based myths 
and stereotypes to undermine the credibility of sexual harassment complainants, 
and to question their consent to sexual conduct in the workplace, is troubling. 
The requirement that a complainant must establish that the impugned conduct 
142. See e.g. Matthews, supra note 11 at 280-81; Halley, “Affirmative Consent”, supra note 12 at 
271-73; Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”, supra note 14 at 90.
143. See e.g. Matthews, supra note 11 at 275; Gruber, supra note 10 at 449-50.
144. Gruber, supra note 10 at 417.
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was “unwelcome” improperly requires her to establish a lack of consent and 
directly facilitates reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes. 
Similar problems concerning a reliance on gender-based myths and 
stereotypes led to shifts towards affirmative consent standards in criminal and 
tort law. As such, a similar shift ought to be undertaken in human rights law, 
which would position the issue of consent or “welcomeness” as a justification, 
rather than as part of the prima facie complaint. This would ameliorate existing 
problems that women, in particular, face in bringing sexual harassment complaints 
forward, and would create greater consistency between the treatment of sexual 
harassment and other forms of discrimination under human rights law.
As social and legal understandings and expectations concerning consent 
and sexual misconduct evolve, human rights law must keep pace. The principles 
governing sexual harassment complaints were decided over thirty years ago, and 
much has changed in that time. It is urgent that sexual harassment law also evolve 
to keep pace with contemporary understandings and expectations, particularly in 
light of the central purpose of human rights law as remedying discrimination for 
individual complainants, and in protecting and promoting equality, including in 
the workplace. While much more is needed to achieve greater sex equality in the 
workplace,145 a reconfiguring of sexual harassment law as proposed above is one 
important step towards this goal.
145. See Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”, supra note 14 at 67.
